

Message Text

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ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 EUR-25 ADP-00 IO-13 CIAE-00 DODE-00

PM-07 H-02 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01

PRS-01 SS-15 USIA-12 NIC-01 OMB-01 SAJ-01 RSR-01 /129 W

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R 251130Z JUN 73

FM USINT CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3287

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

AMEMBASSY TUNIS

USMISSION USUN

C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 1891

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR EG US UR

SUBJECT: INITIAL EGYPTIAN REACTION TO NIXON-BREZHNEV SUMMIT

REF: CAIRO 1610; CAIRO 1860

1. SUMMARY; OVER PAST FEW WEEKS EGYPTIAN PRESS HAS EXPRESSED APPREHENSION OVER OUTCOME OF SUMMIT. NOW THAT SUMMIT IS OVER, PRESS SEEMS TO BE IN PROCESS OF CONFIRMING ITS FEARS. END SUMMARY

2. SINCE BEGINNING OF JUNE, CAIRO PRESS HAS BEEN PLAYING THEME THAT ANOTHER US/SOVIET SUMMIT WHICH PAID NO OR LITTLE ATTENTION TO ME CRISIS WAS IN OFFING. VARIOUS EDITORIALISTS, INCLUDING SOME OF EGYPT'S MAJOR WRITERS, CONTRIBUTED TO PRESS PLAY BY DEVELOPING THEME
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THAT US BACKING FOR ISRAEL IS COMPLETE, WHILE SOVIET

BACKING FOR ARABS IS HALF-HEARTED. THERE WERE A NUMBER OF ATTEMPTS TO REMIND SOVIETS OF THEIR "RESPONSIBILITIES" TOWARDS ARABS. THESE WERE GENERALLY TEMPERED WITH EXPLANATIONS THAT SOVIET AND ARAB POLICIES DID NOT NECESSARILY COINCIDE, AND THAT SOVIETS HAD TO LOOK AFTER THEIR OWN INTERESTS ELSEWHERE. USSR'S NIGGARDLINESS IN SUPPLYING ARMS TO EGYPT, MOSCOW'S EMIGRATION POLICY AND OTHER SKELETONS IN SOVIET CLOSET (FROM ARAB VIEWPOINT) WERE SPOTLIGHTED IN PROCESS.

3. WITH SUMMIT NOW OVER, ALL THREE CAIRO DAILIES HAVE TAKEN IT UPON THEMSELVES TO COMMENT ON RESULTS EVEN THOUGH COMMUNIQUE NOT YET ISSUED. AHRAH FOCUSES ON PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR KISSINGER'S REPORTED STATEMENT OF JUNE 24 (TEXT NOT YET RECEIVED) THAT ME CRISIS IS NO LONGER ONE OF SOVIET/US CONFRONTATION, THAT INTERVENTION WOULD ONLY WORSEN IT, AND BEST WAY TO HANDLE IT IS FOR PARTIES TO DISPUTE TO TALKS WITH EACH OTHER. AHRAH'S ALI AL-GAMMAL STATES THAT THIS INDICATES SOVIET AND US LEADERS DID NOT GIVE ME ISSUE DUE ATTENTION WHEN IT WAS REALIZED THAT IT NO LONGER CONSTITUTED A DANGER TO THEIR RELATIONS. "IT APPEARS," CONCLUDES GAMMAL, "THAT THEY DO NOT WANT IT TO BE SOLVED." AKHBAR SHARPLY CRITICIZES KISSINGER STATEMENT, WHILE GUMHURIYYA STATES THAT NO SURPRISES SHOULD COME FROM SUMMIT, SINCE IT IS CLEAR THAT ME CRISIS IS FROZEN. REGARDING SOVIET UNION, GUMHURIYYA (USUALLY A STRONG SOVIET BACKER) STATES THAT USSR IS HENCEFORTH "DESTINED TO PLAY ONLY A SECONDARY ROLE IN THE CAUSE OF LIBERATION AND VICTORY."

4. COMMENT: HAND-WRITING TO EFFECT THAT SUPERPOWERS HAVE ONCE AGAIN SUBORDINATED ME ISSUE TO THEIR OWN INTERESTS LEADS TO INTERESTING QUESTION OF WHERE SUMMIT WILL PUT EGYPTIAN/SOVIET RELATIONS. WHILE IMMEDIATE FOCUS OF CRITICAL ATTENTION IS ON KISSINGER STATEMENT, MANY EGYPTIAN WILL SEE IN IT CONFIRMATION OF THEIR FEARS THAT SOVIETS HAVE LET THEM DOWN. IN CURRENT PRESS PLAY WE CAN SEE THE REFLECTION OF A FAIRLY DEEP MOOD OF EGYPTIAN DISENCHANTMENT WITH MOSCOW. SOVIETS WILL PROBABLY BE ASKED SOME HARD QUESTIONS ABOUT THEIR ME

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POLICY IN COMING DAYS, AND IF ANSWERS ARE NOT SATISFACTORY, ANTI-SOVIET CRITICISM MAY RISE.

5. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, WE SEE SOVIET AMBASSADOR VINOGRADOV'S APPOINTMENT WITH HAFEZ ISMAIL ON JUNE 24 AS BEING OF MORE THAN PASSING IMPORTANCE.

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